










ZAMBIAN COTTON IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT:  Performance under
Liberalization and Future Challenges
By
David Tschirley and Ballard Zulu
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES:  Cotton is
one unquestioned success of Zambia’s turn toward a
market economy.  After liberalization in late 1994,
production rose from 20,000 mt to more than 100,000
mt in the 1998 harvest year. After collapsing to less
than 50,000 mt in 2000, it has ri1sen steadily and is
expected to approach 150,000 mt in 2003. Over 1998-
2000, exports of cotton and textiles were first among all
agricultural exports in value (Export Board of Zambia,
2001).  The two closest competitors to cotton during
this time – fresh flowers and sugar – are  primarily
produced on large operations, while cotton is almost
entirely a smallholder crop.  Its potential role in poverty
alleviation and food security is thus very large.  The
success of this sector has been achieved despite
historically low cotton prices in the world market over
the past four years, serious problems of credit default
during the late 1990s, and the departure in 1999 of the
sector’s biggest company, Lonrho.
This paper is directed toward policy makers and private
stakeholders in Zambia’s cotton sector.   Its purpose is
threefold:
1) to assess key elements of the performance of
Zambia’s cotton sector relative to other selected
African countries;
2)  to develop preliminary insights into the driving
forces behind Zambia’s performance and also the
threats to improved future performance; and 
3)  to identify key issues within the sector that merit
continued applied research and dialogue with
stakeholders.
The paper grows out of earlier work on cotton by the
Food Security Research Project (Govereh et al. 2000),
and draws heavily on more comprehensive reviews of
cotton sector reform experience in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Tschirley, Boughton, and Tefft  2002, Boughton et al.
2002).  Readers interested in more detail regarding the
reform experience in each country and methods used in
the analysis should consult those papers.
The paper is organized around its three objectives. It
first compares key performance dimensions of
Zambia’s cotton sector to regional neighbors
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Uganda in
Eastern Africa, and Mali and Benin in West Africa.  It
then discusses the determinants of Zambia’s
performance before closing with a discussion of key
issues and focused research that may be useful in
informing those issues.
ZAMBIAN COTTON IN A REGIONAL
CONTEXT: A commodity chain can be defined as the
set of actors and related activities involved in producing
the commodity and making it available in final form to
consumers.  For a crop like cotton in Zambia, these
activities include importing chemical inputs,
multiplying seed, and making each available to farmers;
providing extension assistance to farmers; purchasing
their product and recovering credit;  actions by farmers
and buyers to maintain product quality; processing of
raw cotton; grading and exporting cotton lint; and
spinning of lint.  Actors include tens of thousands of
smallholder and some large farmers, large and small
processing firms, spinners, some cotton traders, input
dealers, and government policy makers.  
Key performance dimensions for any commodity chain
are the levels of productivity and quality throughout the
chain and the extent to which it pays farmers a
competitive share of total value-added. These
objectives may be in conflict in an economy like
Zambia’s.  Ensuring high and rising productivity and
quality require effective coordination between public
and private players.  This coordination may be more
difficult to achieve when there are many buyers at theFSRP POLICY SYNTHESIS  No.  7
Page 2

























Figure 1 .  Plot of mean cotton export value/ha against mean 
producer price share by country, harvest years 1995/96/97

























Figure 2.  Plot of mean cotton export value/ha against mean 
producer price share by country, harvest years 1998 and 1999

























Figure 3.  Plot of mean cotton export value/ha against mean 
producer price share by country, harvest years 2000/01/02
farm level.  Yet increased competition at this level is
typically thought necessary for farmers to receive an
adequate share of the final price.  Such competitive
pricing is one key determinant of long-term
sustainability of cotton production, since farmers who
consistently receive a low price will eventually shift to
more remunerative crops.
The extent to which a commodity chain can perform
well in both dimensions is thus one potentially useful
measure of success.  We focus on these two dimensions
to develop a simple graphical assessment of the
performance of our seven countries over harvest years
1995 –  2002. 
Our horizontal axis, gross export value per hectare,
reflects farm productivity through the farm yield,
productivity in processing through the ginning ratio
1,
and quality throughout the system through the premium
or discount over Index A that each country receives on
their exports.
2  It is a function of short-term
coordination within production and marketing seasons,
and also the success of the country over time in
supporting research, extension, varietal zoning
agreements, and other dimensions that provide the base
for productivity and quality.  To control for the effect of
short-term fluctuations in prices, we use the average
Index A price over the eight years in our analysis,
adjusted for each country’s premiums or discounts.
Our vertical axis is the producer price share of the
sales price realized by ginning companies when they
export cotton lint.
We break our plots into quadrants using median annual
values of export value per ha (US$295/ha) and
producer price share (0.473) for all seven countries
over the 1995-2002 period.  Results are shown in
Figures 1 - 3.  Countries in the southwest quadrant are
the worst performers in each dimension, while those in
the northeast quadrant are the best in each; southeast
and northwest quadrants represent mixed performance.
Seven major patterns emerge from this analysis.  
1  The ginning ratio is the ratio of lint obtained to raw
cotton processed.  In SSA, it ranges from 0.33 in
Mozambique to 0.42 in West Africa.  Zambia’s ratio is
about 0.38.
2  Index A is an index of the prices of eight classes of
cotton of various origins traded in northern Europe.  It is
widely used as the best indicator of world price levels
for this crop.FSRP POLICY SYNTHESIS  No.  7
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–  Zambia paid the highest average producer price share
over the period.  Its price performance has been erratic,
however, dropping from the highest in the first period
to among the lowest in the second, and back to among
the highest in the third.  
–  Zambia was consistently in the middle of the pack in
export value per ha, above Mozambique and Uganda
and comparable to Tanzania.  Unlike Tanzania,
Zambia’s performance in this dimension increased
steadily over the periods.  
–  Three countries (Mali, Benin, and Zimbabwe)
consistently achieved much higher export value per ha
than other countries.  Within this group, Mali and Benin
consistently outperformed Zimbabwe.
–  The price performance of Mali and Benin improved
substantially over the periods, while Zimbabwe’s fell
dramatically in the final period.
3 
–  Tanzania’s performance in both dimensions
worsened over time, while Mozambique and Uganda
consistently performed among the worst in both
variables.  
DETERMINANTS OF ZAMBIA’S
PERFORMANCE:  This analysis suggests that the
performance of Zambia’s cotton sector compares
favorably with its neighbors in Southern and Eastern
Africa, with export values per ha well above those in
Uganda and Mozambique but below Zimbabwe, and
producer prices during the final period that far
exceeded those in all these SEA countries.  However,
Zambia lagged well behind Mali and Benin in both
respects. Table 1 provides further information from the
2000, 2001, and 2002 harvest years to allow us to look
behind these performance numbers.  Six points stand
out:
–  Zambia is unique among the countries analyzed in
the almost complete absence of government in
production, marketing, regulation, or direct financial
contribution to the sector.
4  
–  The cotton sectors in Zimbabwe, Mali, and Benin --
the countries that have outperformed Zambia in export
value/ha -- have all received subsidies from donors and
the state.  Subsidies in Zimbabwe started with a 30-year
soft loan from the World Bank to the Cotton Marketing
Board (CMB - now Cottco) in 1992, and included
financial injections from government as late as 2001.
Farmers in West and Central Africa as a whole received
US$50-60 million in subsidies during the last cropping
season alone (Badiane, et al. 2002).
– Zimbabwe, Mali, and Benin all have concentrated
market structures (though Zimbabwe’s has become less
concentrated in the past two years), and government in
each influences competition, unlike in Zambia.  In
Zimbabwe, this influence is indirect through
bureaucratic favoritism (Tschirley, Boughton, and Tefft
2002), while Mali and Benin impose heavy direct
regulation.
–  A key determinant of Zimbabwe’s success to date
had been its positive economic environment, especially
more effective input markets than its neighbors and a
legal system that allowed cost-effective seizure of
assets of defaulters.  The country’s ongoing political
and economic problems may now be undermining this
success.
–  Of the three countries that have performed worse
than Zambia in export value per ha, two -- Tanzania
and Uganda -- have seen heavy entry of ginners and
traders since liberalization.  Input distribution collapsed
with reform in Tanzania, and reform was unable to
revive Uganda’s collapsed system.  In each case, heavy
public sector involvement has been used to revive input
distribution while continuing to allow competition for
purchase of raw cotton (Tschirley, Boughton, and Tefft
2002).
– Much like Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda have
systemic deficiencies in their input and varietal
development systems that result in persistently very low
farm yields.  Protracted civil conflict contributed to
these problems in each country.  Mozambique may
have perpetuated its position by attempting
systematically to eliminate price competition among
firms (through its so-called “Concession System” of
regional monopolies) and failing to create mechanisms
to encourage competition on quality of assistance.  
Zambia’s cotton sector emerges from this analysis as a
remarkable success. With no direct support from
government or donors, the sector has improved
3  Analysis of US$ prices in Zimbabwe is made difficult by the
country’s dual exchange rate policy.  Calculations in this paper
use the “blend” rate, which is a weighted average of official
and parallel rates.  See Goreux for more detail.
4  The Cotton Development Trust (CDT) has to date focused
on technical issues.  Mulungushi Textiles is a joint venture
between the governments of Zambia and China (Mainland), but
has a small market share and acts as a private company.FSRP POLICY SYNTHESIS  No.  7
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productivity and quality
5 while paying farmers a higher
average price share than any other country in the
analysis.  We suggest that this performance has been
the result of several factors.  First, the research system
released two varieties shortly before liberalization
(Chureza in 1988 and F-135 in 1992/93 – see Zulu and
Tschirley 2002) that have provided the basis for current
farm yields and ginning ratios.  Second, Lintco’s
privatization was done in an orderly manner which
allowed Lonrho and Clark to establish themselves
without heavy debts nor immediate competition from
companies and traders not strongly committed to the
cotton sector.  Finally, once competition did emerge
and the initial crisis which it caused was overcome (see
discussion below), Zambia appears to have found an
effective balance between the often conflicting needs
for coordination and competition in the sector.
Zambia’s sector is concentrated, as in Mali, Benin, and
Zimbabwe.  Unlike Mali and Benin, competition in
Zambia is not regulated.  Zimbabwe has one dominant
firm that has received assistance from donors and
government, while Zambia has two dominant firms who
have received no such assistance.  The resulting pattern
and level of competition may have been crucial to
ensure remunerative prices to farmers while not being
debilitating for the input credit system, as in Uganda
and Tanzania.  
KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE:  The challenge
for Zambia’s cotton sector today can be conceived as
follows: how can it maintain the workable level of
competition it currently demonstrates while
strengthening the coordination that is needed to
increase export value per ha?  Viewed in this way, a
number of issues emerge.
Are the Dunavant Distributor System and Clark
outgrower scheme sustainable?  Zambia suffered a
period of severe credit default by farmers during the
late 1990s as competitors to the two dominant firms
first emerged.  The move by Lonrho/ Dunavant to its
Distributor System was a key factor in overcoming this
crisis while improving the quality of assistance to
farmers.  The system appears to have reduced the costs
to the company of supporting smallholders while
simultaneously increasing repayment rates.  Clark has
developed its own approach to this problem, apparently
also with some success.
6  Yet these companies are
competing in the export market with enormous
subsidies from developed countries
7 and, unlike West
and Central Africa and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe, are
doing so without any state or donor support.  Can these
companies maintain the quality of their assistance and
extend its reach under these conditions?  If not, what
should be the policy position of the government? 
If external financial assistance to the sector is pursued,
what should it focus on and how should it be designed?
The fact that the sector substantially overcame the
credit default crisis of the late 1990s on its own
suggests that any new program in this area should focus
on reducing the cost to private companies of providing
input and extension services to farmers, and should not
replace or fundamentally alter the private systems
already in place.
8  In addition, any new program should
be carefully designed to a) encourage continued
innovation by private firms as they compete on the
quality of their service, and b) avoid further
consolidating the market positions of the two largest
companies, since the competition from smaller players
may be important in maintaining competitive price
shares for farmers.  The effective private innovations of
Dunavant and perhaps Clark in dealing with input
provision and credit recovery distinguish Zambia’s
cotton sector from every other country in this analysis
except Zimbabwe.  Maintaining an environment that
rewards such private innovations is crucial to the
sector’s continued success.
Farm yields and ginning ratios in Zambia continue to
lag well behind those in Zimbabwe and West and
Central Africa, and lint quality is substantially lower
than in Zimbabwe.  Varietal development can have
major impacts on each of these aspects.  Thus, the fact
that no new varieties have been released since
liberalization does not bode well for the sector’s future
performance.  Development, dissemination, and
maintenance of new varieties and consistent delivery of
high quality extension assistance require substantial
resources over long periods of time, and this may be
5  Quality has improved through effective control of
polypropylene contamination. 
6  Clark declines to discuss the details of it’s outgrower
scheme.
7  ICAC estimates that subsidies are 50% of world prices in the
U.S., 20% in China, and over 100% in the EU. Elimination of
U.S. subsidies alone would raise world prices in the short-run
by as much as US$0.12/lb.
8  We do not suggest that credit default is no longer a problem
and could not again reach crisis proportions.  Rather, we argue
that the private sector innovations which have emerged under
the current level and pattern of competition are valuable and
arguably sustainable, and should not be negatively affected by
any new program.FSRP POLICY SYNTHESIS  No.  7
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difficult to ensure at needed levels through forced
savings (e.g., levies) within the sector.  This area thus
becomes an obvious choice for funding by government
and donors. The key to obtaining and successfully
deploying funding for this issue will be strong
collaboration between government, private companies,
and farmers to ensure a clear vision and effective
management.  A strengthened and perhaps reorganized
CDT would need to play a major role in any such
initiative.  
In this context, Zambia needs to seriously assess the
potential impact of Bt cotton on profitability for
smallholders and cotton companies.  Work on this issue
in 1999 was abandoned due to the lack of a biosafety
regulatory framework.  Currently, such a framework is
bogged down at the Ministerial level.  A key step
forward would be to recognize that biotechnology in a
nonfood cash crop like cotton raises fewer controversial
issues than it does in maize, and to move forward with
a framework that would allow the testing of Bt cotton.
What can Zambia do to lobby for “free trade” in
cotton?  Elimination of cotton subsidies in the U.S. and
EU could do more for cotton sectors in SSA in the
short- to medium-run than any other single action.
How can Zambia work with its neighbors (perhaps
through the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa) to effect this change, while continuing to
grapple effectively with the long-run challenge of
improving productivity and quality in the system?
What applied research and policy dialogues are needed
to inform future policy and program choice?  Cotton
liberalization in Zambia has been characterized by the
almost complete absence of direct government
involvement in the sector. Results to date have been
encouraging, but future performance is likely to depend
on more active strategic collaboration between
government and the private sector, including farmers.
Technology development and diffusion are one key
area where such collaboration is needed.  Another may
be in sustainable mechanisms for input delivery and
credit recovery. A better understanding of the
organization, effectiveness, and sustainability of
Dunavant’s Distributor System and Clark’s outgrower
scheme could assist in the design of strategic programs
of private-public collaboration to ensure their continued
success.  
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Tel: 234 539; fax: 234 559; e-mail: fsrp1@msu.edu.Table 1. Relationship Between the Market for Seed Cotton Purchase and Performance of the Cotton Input System in Seven Countries of SSA,
2000-2002 Harvest Years
Country Broader Ag Input System
-----------------------------------------------------------------     Cotton Sector     -----------------------------------------------------------------















Mozambique Pervasive market failure;
almost no purchased input
use outside out-grower






Heavy 333 (6) No 90%+
(All credit)
Old (>20 yrs),









Zambia Some access: 20% of small
farmers obtain fertilizer




(top 2 have 80-
90% market
share)











Micronutrient foliar feed on credit.
Basal for cash sale, <10% use.
Zimbabwe Broad access: 70-80% of
cotton farmers obtain inputs






















Cottco provides basal fertilizer on credit
in all input packages
Tanzania Pervasive market failure Many players
(30+)
None 496 (5) No 90%+
(No credit: cash




Mostly fuzzy untreated.  
Supply problems due to





No data on how many
farmers apply.
None
Uganda Pervasive market failure Many players
(30-40).  Top 5
have 40%
market share.
Moderate 296 (7) No Seed: 90%+
Chemicals: ??
Single old variety. Lack
of multiple varieties
reduces degeneration. 
Mostly fuzzy untreated. 
Supply problems due to







Mali Broad access to inputs on
credit outside cotton zone. 


















recommended by IER and CMDT;
widespread under dosage
Benin Broad access throughout
country




Similar to Mali Similar to Mali